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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the year 1968 the Survey Research Institute at Allensbach (FRG) conducted a 
national poll in the Federal Republic of Germany in which a representative sample 
of German women were asked what kind of profession the ideal husband should 
have. In 1968 the most attractive profession for a man was that of nuclear physi-
cist. Eleven years later the same question was again asked of all females between 
the ages of 16 and 70. In this poll the nuclear physicist was not even mentioned 
among the first 20 nominations. The top of the list was occupied by a completely 
different type of professional activity. The winner of the game was forest ranger 
(Allensbach, 1979)! 
What has the attractiveness of male professions to do with risk perceptions? 
There are two answers to this question: 
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(1) The shift. of prestige assignment. from a t.echnology-orient.ed t.o a nature-
oriented profession reveals a semantic change in t.he public understanding of 
risk. In t.he past., technology was predominantly perceived as a powerful 
means of reducing risks due t.o natural catastrophes, climate variations, 
infectious diseases, and biological compet.it.ors for food and biot.ope (Markl, 
1980), but. in recent. years it has become increasingly associated with causing 
risks and t.hreats to human beings and t.he natural environment.. People have 
become aware of t.he fact. t.hat. the tools t.hat. liberated them from natural con-
st.raint.s themselves posed new risks on t.heir lives (Hohenemser et a.l, 1981, p 
2; Renn, 1984; Renn and Swat.on, 1984). 
(2) The change of professional prestige in modern societies further demonst.rat.es 
t.he interdependences bet.ween perceptions, general social at.tit.udes, values, 
and world views. There is no doubt. t.hat. science is dependent. on the concept. 
of isolating specific phenomena from their natural or social cont.ext. in order 
t.o construct. modes of causal or sequential relationships with t.he aid of 
analytical techniques. This is also t.rue for studies of risk perception. How-
ever, it. should be kept. in mind t.hat. in real life risk perception does not. exist. 
as a distinct. psychological process among other types of perception, but. 
forms an integral part of assembling and representing beliefs and perceived 
characteristics of an object. or event. in t.he mind of t.he individual. Considera-
tions of risks may or may not. play a major role in t.his opinion- or judgment-
forming process. Potential benefits, side effects, symbolic meanings, value 
orientations, the at.t.it.udes of reference groups about. the risk source, and t.he 
prestige and image of those who promote or oppose implementation of t.he risk 
source are just. some of t.he many factors, apart. from risk considerations, that. 
influence people's perceptions of objects or events (Pearce, 1978; Hoes, 
1980; Thompson, 1980; Conrad, 1981b; Lee, 1981). 
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Division into features relating t.o t.he risk and those relating t.o t.he risk 
source is admittedly a purely analytical expedient. for psychological research. In 
reality, people judge objects, events, and activities only, and not. risks ( r;/. Brown 
and Green, 1980). 
Would it. then not. be bet.t.er t.o remove t.he concept. of risk perception from t.he 
terminology of cognitive psychology and t.o replace it. by object. perception? This 
sort. of recommendation can indeed be justified in view of t.he often unthinking use 
of t.he concept. of risk perception, but. it. is not. necessary from t.he nature of t.he 
case, for perception of an object. naturally also includes perception of t.he hazar-
dous consequences of this object., their mental assimilation, and t.he development. of 
general mechanisms t.o cope with t.he situation of uncertainty (Renn and Peters, 
1982). Thus t.he hierarchical rank of aspects related t.o risk, benefit., and uncer-
tainty with respect. t.o object. assessment. can be analytically investigated. In t.he 
same way t.he separate measurement. of object. and risk perception can answer t.he 
question whether there are typical patterns in t.he intuitive perception of risk 
sources which can give some pointers toward t.he "common sense" assimilation of 
uncertainty owing t.o potential danger sources. 
2 BASIC CONCEPTS OF RISK PERCEPTION 
For t.he purpose of reviewing t.he major theoretical concepts and empirical studies 
in t.he field of risk perception it. is necessary t.o define t.he main terms frequently 
used in t.he literature on risk perception. 
Object perception 
Object perception describes t.he process of mentally representing and assimilating 
information and experience with respect. t.o a physical object or entity (Renn and 
Peters, 1982). 
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Values 
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit and distinctive of an individual or 
characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from 
available modes, means, and ends of action (Kluckhorn, 1951). 
Beliefs 
A belief represents the cognitive images a person has of a given object, i.e., it is a 
probability judgment whether an attribute is or is not, and to what degree, associ-
ated with the perception of an object. The subjective feeling of goodness and bad-
ness which is linked with each attribute refers to the effect a person might have 
and is called subjective evaluation (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). 
Attitude 
Attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized t.hrough experience, 
exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all 
objects and situations with which it is related (Allport, 1935). 
Concerns 
A concern refers to a state of positive or negative responsiveness of individuals t.o 
awareness and processing of any information or personal experience regarding 
salient areas of interest on that matter (Renn and Swaton, 1984). 
Risk perception 
Perceived risk is the combined evaluation that is made by an individual of the 
likelihood t.hat an adverse event will occur in the future e.nd its probable conse-
quence (Royal Society, 1983, p 34). 
In Figure 1 an attempt is made to illustrate the interconnections between 
beliefs, concerns, values, attitudes, and perceptions. The model includes five 
basic categories: physical environment., social environment, cultural environment., 
psychological motives, and socialized motives. Any individual is confronted with a 
specific object that is embedded in a social situation and a cultural context 
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Figure 1. A conceptual framework of the interdependences between beliefs, con-
cerns, values, and at.t.it.udes. 
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(symbolic meaning). The physical properties of the specific object and the charac-
teristics of the situation are elements of the individual perception process. The 
perceived properties are not necessarily identical with the real properties. Lim-
ited access to information, intuitive selection fillers, and preevaluations bias the 
perception process. In parallel with the perception of properties the social 
characteristics are assembled and perceived; both processes are combined in the 
subjective assessment of consequences that are associated with the object. Asso-
ciations divided from the cultural context or from personal experience are also 
activated at this stage and are compared with the subjectively assessed conse-
quences. 
The next step refers to the phase of processing the perceived object proper-
lies, situational characteristics. predicted consequences. and associations into a 
belief system. The selection of what enters the belief system, the mode of abstrac-
tion from personal experience and mediated information in order to form general-
ized convictions, and the way of ordering the perceived items into salient clusters 
are influenced by the value orientations, emotions, and altitudes toward similar 
objects. In addition, general heuristics and personal style of reasoning have to be 
taken into account. 
The last step refers to the process of balancing positive and negative beliefs, 
aiming toward a general evaluative judgment with respect to the object. For this 
purpose, beliefs are ordered according to their subjective importance, the judg-
ments of reference groups are incorporated, the personal consequences of each 
possible judgment are assessed, and the possible outcomes are compared with ear-
lier experience with similar objects. 
This outline is, of course, just an analytical tool for understanding the pro-
cess of altitude formation. The various stages are interlinked in the real world 
and proceed much more unconsciously, as pointed out here. However, it 
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represents a theoretical framework t.hat. helps to analyze our research concepts 
and t.he results of risk perception studies. 
According to t.he analytical framework of object perception and attitude for-
mation risk perception studies focus on three key questions: 
(1) What are the social goals, values, or motives that drive persons or social 
groups to attribute special concerns to specific risk sources? 
(2) In what. way do people process information about risk sources, and what kind 
of logical structure and reasoning do they follow in arriving at. an overall 
judgment on the acceptability of a perceived risk? 
(3) What kind of motivational or cognitive biases are incorporated when people 
select information from the various sources to which they have access, and 
why do they apparently violate their own rules of reasoning? 
A more integrated approach to the investigation of risk perception can be 
developed by taking these three questions into account. For this purpose, we can 
divide risk perception studies into four rough categories: classical decision 
analysis, psychological decision theory, social-psychological judgment and atti-
tude theory, and sociological concepts including policy analysis. 
Classical decision analysis focuses on the rationality of the decision-making 
process under the assumption that we can make use of formal axioms to optimize 
our own judgment (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). If we go a step further and demand 
that the optimization process be adapted to the individual met.arat.ional criteria of 
reasoning, this kind of research fits exactly into our key question (3) above. 
Psychological decision theory (including social judgment theory) has put. its 
emphasis on the individual process of common-sense reasoning, incorporating the 
social desirability of perceived consequences and specific motivational factors in 
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processing uncertaint.y (Hammond et a./.., 1978). Research in t.his field can best. be 
classified under key quest.ion (2), because it.s purpose is t.o head t.oward t.he indivi-
dual process of understanding t.he representat.ion and assimilat.ion of perceived 
hazards and t.heir probabilit.ies, which leads t.o t.he fonnat.ion of an overall judg-
ment.. Risk percept.ion is being underst.ood as a process of deriving at.t.ribut.es 
about. specific object.s from general social values and personal at.t.it.udes and link-
ing t.hese at.t.ribut.es t.o t.he perceived properties of t.he risk object. or risk sit.ua-
t.ion (Janis and Mann, 1977). This research lies on t.he borderline bet.ween key 
quest.ions (1) and (2). 
Finally, sociological research addresses t.he problem of group responses t.o 
risk and concent.rat.es on t.he influence of social values, inst.it.ut.ional const.raint.s, 
reference group judgment.s, communicat.ion, and power int.erchange (Nelkin, 1977b; 
Ot.way and von Wint.erfeldt., 1982; Frederichs et a.l., 1963). It. is int.erest.ing t.o not.e 
t.hat. t.he sociological concept.s of risk percept.ion, in particular st.udies of power 
and pressure groups, have some feat.ures in common wit.h t.he concept.s of 
mat.hemat.ical decision analysis - t.he ot.her ext.reme of t.he scient.ific spect.rum. 
Bot.h concept.s assume t.hat. individuals t.ry t.o maximize t.heir own ut.ilit.y (in socio-
logical t.erms, t.heir int.erest.) and t.hat. object.ive measures can be ident.ified t.o indi-
cat.e whet.her individuals or groups are bet.t.er or worse off aft.er t.he risk has been 
taken. In decision t.heory t.he expect.ed ut.Uit.y is an object.ive measure of a 
person's gain or loss; in sociological t.heory gain or loss of power is an object.ive 
yardst.ick for measuring social influence. In our framework sociological research 
deals primarily wit.h key quest.ion (1). 
Ta.ble 1 gives an impression of t.he scope of scient.ific research in t.he field of 
risk percept.ion. It. should be acknowledged t.hat. t.he syst.emat.ic overview simplifies 
t.he complex sit.uat.ion of risk research and ignores much of t.he concept.ual differ-
ences wit.hin each class. For a more detailed classificat.ion reference should be 
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'!'able 1 Classiricat.ion or risk peroept.ion st.udies 
Resea.rch. Sh.ort Genera.t Apptica.tion 
scope de scription a.ssumption to risk 
perception 
Decision Matching t.he decision Maximizing ut.111t.y lnvest.igating t.be 
prooess with normative or individuals discrepancies between 
model or rational or groups normat.1 ve risk 
reasoning assessment. and 
lnt ul t.1 ve peroept.1on 
Psychological Analysis or t.he Exist.enoe or Investigating t.be 
decision individual decision- typical sequential cognitive st.ruot.ure 
theory making process st.ruct.ures t.o or t.he risk 
make Judgments peroept.ion prooess 
under unoert.aint.y 
Social- Analysis or the Domlnanoe or lnvest.lgat.lng t.he 
psyoho- social environment. soclalln!luenoe ln!luenoe or value 
log1oal as a det.ermlnat.or raot.ors in oommlt.ment.s, social 
theory ror the decision- peroel ving and Judgment, and communi-
making prooess evaluating risks cation processes on t.he 
individual deolsion-
making prooess 
Soolo- Effects and lmpli- Risk taking as an lnvest.lgating t.be 
logical cations or social element. or social lnt.erest.s and soolal 
theory interrelations exchange regarding positions which 
between groups and resources and impose specific risk 
institutions on collec- power perception procedures 
t.ive deolsion-maklng 
made to the corresponding literature (see Otway, 1977; Becker et a.l., 1980; 
Covello, 1982; Royal Society, 1983; Renn, 1984). 
3 RESULTS OF RISK PERCEPTION STUDIES 
According to the various disciplines involved in risk perception research various 
conceptual frameworks have been used to determine the main factors that influ-
ence people's judgment on expected consequences and their likelihood. Research-
ers who work with utility concepts investigate predominantly the individual balanc-
ing procedure and intuitive heuristics that govern the process of assimilating and 
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evaluating information about. risks. The most frequently applied instruments in t.his 
category of research studies are psychometric scales, semantic differentials, and 
correlation circles for determining spatial differences between various risks (Pel-
licier et a.L., 1977; Fischhoff et a.L., 1978; Vlek and St.allen, 1981; Pag~s et a.L., 
1982). 
Researchers who pursue the altitude concept are searching for salient 
beliefs and effects t.hal determine the overall feeling of an individual toward the 
object. and influence the willingness t.o t.ake actions in correspondence with that 
feeling (Otway, 1980; Thomas et a.L., 1980; Swat.on and Renn, 1984). Altitude 
researchers usually use questionnaires t.o collect. beliefs and affective pat.t.erns, 
which are later processed by factor analysis in order t.o detect. the salient factors 
of risk perception. 
Researchers who focus on value commflment.s and concerns analyze the course 
of social interaction between promoters and opponents of t.he new risk object or 
risk activity. The also observe the process of attitude formation as a function of 
avoiding dissonances between value orientations and the selective perception of 
information concerning properties of t.he risk object. and t.he position and values of 
the people associated wit.h t.he object.. Within this research tradition surveys and 
direct. observations are the most. common instruments t.o analyze the causes of the 
development of various positions toward a risk source and t.o reveal t.he social con-
straints that filler the information that each individual is exposed t.o and which 
predetermines the willingness t.o lake account of positive and negative conse-
quences (Bechman et a.L., 1981; Conrad, 1981a; Wynne, 1984). 
In addition to these three basic concepts, more sociologically oriented 
approaches have to be mentioned which regard risk perception as em element of 
t.he continuous struggles of social groups for power and social influence (prestige, 
status, etc.). However, since this approach lakes no interest. in the investigation 
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of the underlying psychological and social factors of risk perception, it does not 
need a more specific consideration in this paper (Mazur, 1975; Nelkin, 1977a; 
Kitschelt, 1980; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). 
The three perspectives of risk perception are not exclusive, but focus on dif-
ferent aspects of the perception process: the rationale of people to produce a bal-
anced judgment, the genesis of beliefs about objects, and the social dynamics of 
processing and evaluating information. Hence it is not necessary to present the 
results of empirical studies separately for each research tradition. Rather, it 
seems appropriate to initiate a review based on a more fundamental insight into the 
individual process of forming beliefs about risk and risk sources, and to enlarge 
the discussion step by step with more remote factors, such as value orientations 
and trust in sources of information. Since the field of risk perception has become 
rather popular in recent years and numerous studies have been published, the fol-
lowing review can only address the highlights and discuss the main results. In 
order to be as brief and precise as possible, the review is organized as a collec-
tion of theses: 
{1) In general people do a good job in assessing the magnitude of a risk that is 
familiar to them. In principle they are quite aware of the threats and dangers 
to which they are exposed. Figure Z shows the results of two surveys, one 
American and one German. A random sample of persons in Germany and 
several groups in the USA were asked to estimate t.he average losses per year 
from various sources of hazard: estimated values are plot.t.ed on t.he 71 axis 
and the actual statistical figures on the z axis. There is a general tendency, 
in both the USA and Germany, to overestimate low risks and underestimate 
high risks, although the German sample tends rather to exaggerate the real 
figures. Nonetheless, the extent of agreement between estimated and act.ual 
values is fairly high (Lichtenstein et a.L., 1978; Slavic et a.L., 1979; Renn and 
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Peters, 1982). 
(2) The intuitive ability to determine the order of magnitude of risk disappears as 
soon as questions are asked relating to the number of lives lost in a catas-
trophic year, to be expected once during the span of a lifetime. Either all 
risk sources are graded almost uniformly, assigning around 3000 losses for 
each risk source, or exorbitant estimates are made, e.g., an average of 22000 
deaths for drug abuse, 4000 for skiing accidents, and as many as 600 000 
deaths caused by nuclear power (all these figures are related to the Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Renn, 1981). When estimates are made for a normal 
average year, experience and common sense can bring about a relatively good 
approximation of the st.alist.ical values. However, when questions are related 
to disasters that can be expected over 80-100 years, the intuitive evaluation 
processes will not function since the extent of catastrophes cannot be drawn 
directly from a person's own experience (Slovic et c:U., 1979; Renn, 1981; von 
Winterfeldt et c:U., 1981). 
(3) If statistical or intuitively estimated values for expected losses are related to 
the intuitive rating of the benefit level, or to a risk-benefit rat.io, an aston-
ishing result is obt.a.ined. Presumed loss rates per year and risk perception 
(also risk-benefit perception) are practically independent of .each other, 
i.e., most people do not assess risk sources according to the presumed losses 
per year but concentrate on other points of view (Renn and Peters, 1982). 
This insight is true not only of the German interviewers; American, English, 
French, and Australian studies confirm the low correlation between the 
public's loss estimation and risk perception (Slovic et c:U., 1979; Glennon, 
1980; Pag~s et a.L .. 1982; Royal Society, 1983). Thus most people are more or 
less aware of the expected value of well-known risks; however, the expected 
values are merely one factor among many in the perception of these risks and, 
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as correlation analyses show, a factor with only slight. explanatory value. 
(4) Most. people are not. familiar with t.he rationale of probability. When the pro-
babilities of adverse effects are not. intuitively comprehensible (as in the 
unlikely example of a jumbo jet crashing int.o a football stadium), the per-
ceived degree of riskiness is likely t.o be related t.o t.he worst. imagined 
accident. If t.he imagination of catastrophes is enhanced by media coverage, 
the negative risk perception is further reinforced. This coping mechanism 
tends to evoke high sensitivity for low probability-high consequence risks 
and a strong degree of disinterest. in high probability-low consequence risks 
(Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974; Ross, 1977; Jungermann, 1982). 
(5) The attendant. circumstances, i.e., the way in which people are exposed to a 
certain risk, are considered in the literature as qualitative features which 
influence the perception process. According to the investigations of Slovic 
and coworkers, t.hree main factors shape the intuitive assimilation of risk-
related information: the severity of losses when they occur (dread), the fami-
liarity with the risk, and the "degree of personnel exposure" (societal versus 
personal risk-taking) (Slovic et al., 1980, 1981). Studies of the quality of 
hazards lead to similar results. The Dutch researchers Vlek and St.allen came 
to the conclusion that risk perception is dependent. on the "size of a potential 
accident." and on the perceived "degree of organized safety" (Vlek and Stal-
len, 1981, pp 235 fl.). Green and Brown report. a high preoccupation of people 
for natural versus man-made risks, necessary versus unnecessary activities, 
major consequences versus minor impacts, personal control versus out of con-
trol, and easy versus difficult to escape (Green and Brown, 1980; Perusse, 
1980). In contrast. with the above studies, which use aggregational pro-
cedures for all risk sources in order to reveal universal factors for charac-
terizing risk qualities, the studies by Gardner et al. (1980, pp 26 ff.) and by 
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Renn (1981) were designed t.o analyze t.he independence of qualit.at.ive charac-
teristics for each risk source (Renn, 1981). Figure 8 shows t.he significance 
of individual qualitative features t.o t.he evaluation of t.he risk in question for 
nine risk sources. The corresponding correlation coefficient. is on t.he 11 axis, 
i.e., t.he intensity of t.he relationship is depicted, and boxes wit.h individual 
feature classes for nine different. risk sources are given on t.he :e axis. 
If we first. consider t.he primary factors, i.e., t.he features t.hat. exert. t.he 
greatest. influence on risk evaluation, it. becomes apparent. that. benefit-
related point.s of view predominate. People first. of all evaluate risks accord-
ing t.o the possibilities and accompanying circumstances of their application, 
e.g. , whether t.hey themselves can profit. from t.hem, whether t.hey are of bene-
fit. t.o everyone or only a minority, and whet.her there are not. further alterna-
tives that. provide the same benefit wit.h less risk. In the case of nuclear 
energy, pesticides, and electrical appliances t.he emphasis is on risk features. 
Whereas t.he volunt.ariness of utilization brings about. a positive weighting of 
the concomitant. risk in t.he case of electrical appliances, t.he dominance of t.he 
factor "catastrophic consequences possible" in t.he case of nuclear energy 
and "possibilities of long-term damage" in t.he case of pesticides has a nega-
tive effect. on risk perception. It. is t.hus clear t.hat. st.e.t.ist.ical loss rates are 
not. t.he decisive motives for skepticism t.oward nuclear energy and pesticides. 
(6) Apart. from qualitative risk features, which are believed t.o be universal fac-
t.ors in the risk perception process, research has been conducted t.o find 
salient. clusters of beliefs relating t.o different. sources of risk. Large-scale 
experiments carried out. by t.he Risk Assessment. Group of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, showed that. people classify their attitudes 
t.oward energy systems according to t.he following criteria: indirect. effects 
from t.he risk source (e.g., health hazards); economic benefit.s (e.g., increase 
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in the national income); environmental risks (e.g., pollution); psychological 
and physical implications (e.g., capacity for control of the risk, artificiality 
of the risk source); effect on social and technical progress (e.g., providing 
security of supply, social leveling). These five dimensions in altitudes were 
obtained on the basis of the results of surveys of the assessment of various 
energy systems (Otway, 1960; Thomas, 1961). Since energy systems only cover 
some of the possible risk sources, we conducted a similar experiment in the 
form of an intensive survey involving 12 different types of risk source. The 
aim was t.o discover the most important altitudes and their systematic struc-
ture. Various statistical procedures were used t.o trace the altitudes sub-
jected t.o enquiry back t.o their central basic pattern (factor analysis) and 
comparable sets of fact.ors were developed by means of aggregation. This 
interpretation gave rise to an allocation and, finally, to an evaluation of risk 
sources under the following five points: 
(1) Effects on the person himself and on the social environment (health, sup-
ply level, security, etc.). 
(ii) Extent t.o which persons are directly affected (personal benefits, dam-
age, comfort, well-being, liberty, etc.). 
(iii) Effects on economic and social welfare (employment market, social level-
ing, general standard of living, quality of life, etc.). 
(iv) Sociopolitical and social values (social justice, democratic rights, equal 
distribution of benefits and detriments, etc.). 
(v) Effects on the conditions for coping with the future (maintaining output 
level, defense of liberty, ensuring supply level, etc.). 
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Not all of these five criteria are brought to bear for every risk source and 
the significance of the individual factors varies greatly. In order to obtain 
an overall view of the intensity and composition of the five criteria for vari-
ous risk sources, the average values of the individual factors have been com-
piled for six risk sources in .FV.gure 4. The bars that extend below the zero 
line show negative estimations with respect to the risk source under con-
sideration, while the bars above the zero line show the corresponding positive 
evaluations (Renn, 1981). 
(7) People seem to avoid risks that pose a pending danger to them. The random-
ness of occurrence is perceived as a potential threat because a dangerous 
situation might occur at a time when the individual is not prepared to react in 
an appropriate manner. Instinctively, human beings react to dangerous situa-
tions with the responses of aggression, escape, or playing dead. If a 
dangerous situation is to be expected, stress is likely to occur so that the 
instinctive reaction can be performed fast and almost automatically. Stress, 
however, cannot be sustained over an extended period of time. Therefore, 
people feel uneasy if a dangerous situation can occur at any time without 
prior notice. In this situation they prefer risk avoidance behavior. If they 
cannot initiate action to move away from the dangerous situation, they demand 
collective regulation as a means of maintaining control over the impending 
danger. This aversion to randomly occurring hazards is not related to any 
probability, but just to the nature of randomness. The feeling of uneasiness is 
reinforced if people have the impression that there will be no time to flee or 
protect themselves against the potential hazard (Green and Brown, 1980; Per-
row, 1984). 
(8) Risk refers to a compound judgment construct.ed on the assessment of per-
sonal utilities and associations with t.he risk source. This explains some of the 
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difficulties that experts encounter when applying risk comparisons in public. 
Risk in connection with skiing, for example, has a different connotation from 
risk related to nuclear energy. Risk in the former application is perceived 
as a peculiar thrill lo lhe individual. In the latter case, however, nuclear 
energy is perceived as a threat. lo personal health. Any attempts locally lo 
compare the two risks fail t.o convince anyone except. the risk expert. 
(Gardner et a.l., 1980; Renn, 1985). 
(9) People are willing to accept. risks more frequently if they feel t.hat risks and 
benefits are distributed equally. Thus justice is a key factor in risk percep-
tion. When risks are confined t.o an identifiable population (e.g., the neigh-
borhood in the vicinity of a hazardous wast.e disposal sit.e), this population is 
likely lo respond negatively lo t.hem. The notion of justice implies two 
categories: equity of risk and benefit. distribution, and exclusiveness of expo-
sure t.o risks or benefits (Keeney, 1980; Renn, 1984). 
(10) In general, it. has been proved t.hat. value orientation and t.he general attitude 
system will increasingly influence risk perception if lhe risk sources have 
already undergone polit.icizat.ion. For example, scientists of the 
Arbeitsgruppe Angewandte Syst.emanalyse (Working Group on Applied Systems 
Analysis), Karlsruhe, discovered that. t.he formation of judgments on nuclear 
energy strongly depends on lhe value orientation of the individual (more 
materialistic, more postmaterialist.ic, more environmentally conscious) which, 
however, has practically no bearing on the perception of coal (Frederichs et 
a.l., 1983). With respect. lo nuclear energy a relationship between value 
orientation and risk assessment. was also revealed in studies performed by 
Renn. Even if general value orientation- similar t.o t.he studies carried out by 
t.he Social Science Research Centre, Los Angeles (von Winterfeldt. et a.l., 1980) 
- is hardly directly related lo the determining factors of risk perception, it. 
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nevertheless codet.ennines the perception process indirectly via t.he forma-
tion of related at.t.it.udinal pat.t.erns (Renn, 1981). Wit.h regard t.o perception 
of t.he nuclear energy risk, t.he perceived risk level is particularly influ-
enced by five sociopolitical at.tit.udes (Fi.gure 5). Low confidence in state-
ments by scientists and technologists combined wit.h a high priority for 
environmental protection produce a more negative perception of nuclear 
energy risks at. t.he outset.. Conversely, confidence in science and technology 
and a low degree of environmental awareness represent. an at.t.it.ude t.hat., from 
t.he start., t.ends to develop positive expected values. However, t.here is no 
deterministic relationship between at.tit.udes in t.he sociopolitical field and 
those toward nuclear energy. 
(11) The credibility of t.he source of information about. risks and risk sources has 
turned out. to be a crucial factor in risk perception. If a person distrusts t.he 
source of information, he or she is more inclined to pay at.t.ent.ion to counter-
information and to demonstrate a risk-averse behavior in order to be on t.he 
safe side. In particular, scientific dissent. and polit.icization with respect. to 
risk sources lead t.o a risk perception process t.hat. is highly governed by sym-
pathies and value commitments in favor of one of t.he involved parties. Sym-
bolic beliefs are substitutes for instrumental considerations (Tubiana, 1979; 
WUn.schmann, 1984). However, t.he perception of objects does not. depend 
solely or even primarily on widely acceptable solutions within t.he scientific 
system. First., scientific dissent. will only have an impact. on public perception 
if scientists themselves regard t.he issue as political and therefore transfer 
t.he dispute int.o a public debate. Second, t.he general public will only be 
aware of any scientific dispute if it.s consequences affect. either their own liv-
ing conditions or t.heir belief system. Thus it. is essential t.hat. t.he perceived 
consequences of any technology are evaluated as salient. wit.h respect. to t.he 
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individual formation of at.t.it.udes before an issue gains political weight.. 
Finally, empirical studies by Renn (1981) on t.he loss of credibility by social 
institutions involved in t.he peaceful use of nuclear energy show that., despite 
t.he loss of confidence in science and politics, a maximum degree of credibility 
continues t.o be given t.o scientists working in t.he field of nuclear research 
and in universities as well as t.o t.he pertinent. politicians (e.g., Minister of 
Research and Technology). This statement. applies t.o both proponents and 
opponents of nuclear energy. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper was t.o review t.he st.at.e of t.he art. in t.he field of risk percep-
tion with specific emphasis on European studies. As in any review a selection has 
had t.o be made with respect. t.o t.he concepts, t.he analytical frameworks, and t.he 
empirical results reported. The review is certainly biased by t.he author's subjec-
tive preferences and interpretations, but. an at.t.empt. was made t.o include all 
relevant information and t.o put t.he results of t.he research studies in perspect.ive. 
Only a small fraction of the empirical research conducted could be presented in 
order t.o keep the paper brief and concise, but enough cross references have been 
given for t.hose who want t.o study t.he formation of risk perception more inten-
sively. 
What has been learned from t.he numerous studies of risk perception? Among 
t.he major results of t.he risk perception studies conducted by psychologists, 
sociologists, and decision analysts, t.he following have immediate impact. on t.he pro-
cess of risk management and policymaking: 
(1) The expected losses over time are only one, and even a minor, element of the 
public perception of risk. Even t.he catastrophe potential cannot be regarded 
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as decisive in the sense that the number of perceived victims in a disaster is 
related to the degree of the perceived riskiness. Rather, subjective proba-
bility regarding the strength of belief that a catastrophe can happen is one of 
the main characteristics that people apply in judging the magnitude of risk. 
(2) Two kinds of variables are found to be important. for the process of risk per-
ception: qualitative risk characteristics and beliefs about. the risk source. 
People will pay special attention t.o risks that are perceived as dreadful, 
involuntary, unaccustomed, and personally uncontrollable, and will be eager 
to obtain more information about the risk source. 
(3) Beliefs about. risk sources vary from risk to risk. There is no universal 
threshold for risk acceptance either for different. risk sources perceived by 
a single individual or for a single risk source assessed by different individu-
als. 
(4) Social, psychological, and sociological studies show that judgments of risky 
technologies or activities depend not only on psychological factors like those 
mentioned above but also on reference group judgments, salient. beliefs about. 
the risk source, degree of loyalty toward official policymakers, and commit-
ment to social values and cultural ideas. Since all these factors, including the 
psychological ones, are interrelated and sometimes reflect mere post.rational-
izat.ions of unconscious feelings and social constraints, it is very difficult to 
set. up a reliable model of how people actually perceive and evaluate risks. 
What. we know is what matters, and partly to what degree it matters, but 
analysts are still searching for a theory that. can explain the process of 
people's judgment. on risks. 
What., in the light of these premises, are the main lessons for policymakers on 
risk management. considering the results of perception studies so far? 
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Primarily, it. has become evident. t.hat. t.he artificially constructed contrast. 
between t.he rational assessment. of experts and t.he supposedly ir-rational assess-
ment. of laymen has not. only disguised t.he true relationships in t.he current. discus-
sion about. risk, but. has also put. considerable difficuli.ics in t.he way of t.he dialogue 
between t.he t.wo sides. The technological calculation of risk dimensions must. be 
regarded as an important. component. of any decision concerning risk sources and 
is also an ideal instrument. for constantly improving t.he safety measures for pro-
tecting the public. However, t.he public is not. disputing the fact.! To make calcula-
tions of this kind t.he sole criterion for "acceptability" and/or "desirability" of 
technologies or of other civilizing risk sources, however, contradicts the intuitive 
view of risk acceptance and is also unreasonable from political and social stand-
points. This should not. be misunderstood as a plea for substituting scientific risk 
assessment. with risk perception analysis. The analysis of perception has also 
demonstrated that. t.he assimilation of uncertainty and the intuitive mechanisms for 
coping wit.h risks are biased by heuristics, personal experience, media coverage, 
and other factors. Modern societies cannot. afford t.o subst.it.ut.e science wit.h com-
mon sense. 
If t.he purpose of science is t.o explain and predict. phenomena, we can expect. 
scientists t.o make a bet.t.er job of prediction than other people. Otherwise science 
would be superfluous. Scientists have a bet.t.er access t.o the collected general 
experience of society (empirical knowledge) and are bet.t.er trained t.o use sys-
tematic and consistent. models of extrapolating past. experience (methodological 
knowledge). The superior degree of accuracy does not. mean, however, that. 
experts are not. susceptible t.o cognitive biases, errors, or mispercept.ions, but. 
that. they are less so than all t.he other members of society [~ t.he model of gra-
duated rationality given by Renn (1981)]. 
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Therefore, risk management has t.o incorporate the result.s of risk perception 
st.udies in t.wo ways: 
{1) First., the dimensions of each risk source or class of risk sources t.hat. are 
perceived as pot.ent.ial violations of t.he individual's own values or int.erest.s. 
{2) Second, the prevalent. t.rade-offs between conflicting values, e.g., cost. versus 
environment., which reflects t.he desire of each cit.izen for t.he living condi-
tions preferred in the future. 
In a pluralistic societ.y the values of each cit.izen should have t.he same impact. 
on policymakin2 as t.hose of experts or policymakers. The technical approach 
adopts t.hose values that. experts deem t.o be adequate with respect. t.o the problem. 
However, such an adequacy does not. exist.. The decision analytic approach feeds 
in t.he values of the client., usually t.he regulator. His or her values are either 
homemade or reflect. t.he regulator's perception of what. t.he public really wants. 
Asking the public directly seems t.o be the optimal solution, but. is not. as easy as it. 
sounds. Values and beliefs are int.errelat.ed. If beliefs are erroneous or t.heir 
underlying cognitive heuristics are biased, many values formed in accordance with 
t.heory are dist.ort.ed. Innovative survey met.hods combining at.tit.ude measure-
ments, information, and participation have t.o be developed t.o meet. this new chal-
lenge t.o social science. A first att.empt. in this direction has been made by a 
research t.eam at. the Nuclear Research Cent.er, Jiilich, and t.he University of 
Wuppert.al who have used t.he method of "planning cells" t.o invest.igate the prefer-
ences of ordinary citizens for future policies on risk management. {Dienel, 1980; 
Rennet a.L., 1984). 
Risk perception is a complex phenomenon t.hat requires more invest.igat.ions 
on a multidisciplinary scientific level. For the purpose of risk management it. is 
essential t.o understand the structure of perception and t.o recognize the concerns 
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that underlie the overt resistance against modern technologies that impose risks 
on the public. 
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